


Vogtle Unit 3 1Q/2016 Performance Summary

[Construction Action Matrix Column:](#)

[Licensee Response](#)



Most Significant Inspection Findings

1Q/2016	G	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter
4Q/2015	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter
3Q/2015	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter
2Q/2015	G	No findings this quarter	G	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter	No findings this quarter

Additional Inspection and Assessment Information

- ❖ [List of Construction Inspection Reports](#)
- ❖ [List of Construction Assessment Reports/Inspection Plans](#)
- ❖ [Vogtle Unit 3 Findings Archive](#)

Design Engineering

Identified By: NRC

Identification Date: 03/31/2016

Significance: Green

Item Type: ITAAC Finding

Failure to Perform AISC N690-94 Required Weld Nondestructive Examination

Green. The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, "Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components" for Southern Nuclear Company's (SNC) failure through their contractor Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) to adequately review and accept nonconforming items in accordance with documented procedures. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as condition reports (CR) 10180672 and 10181738.

The finding was associated with the Design / Engineering Cornerstone. The finding was considered more than minor because the performance deficiency represented a substantive failure to adequately implement a quality assurance process that rendered the quality of a structure, system, or component (SSC) indeterminate. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 2519, "Construction Significance Determination Process," and determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding is associated with a portion of a structure (auxiliary building) assigned to the intermediate risk column of the AP1000 construction significance determination matrix and would not reasonably be expected to impact the design function of the auxiliary building. The inspectors determined that the finding represented an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of VEGP Units 3 and 4 ITAAC 763, in that, if left uncorrected, the licensee may not be able to demonstrate that the acceptance criteria of these ITAAC were met. The acceptance criteria of these ITAAC require that all deviations between the as-built structures and the approved designs be reconciled to verify that the as-built structures will withstand the design basis loads without a loss of structural integrity or other safety-related functions.

The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately review and accept nonconforming items in accordance with documented procedures may have resulted in a deviation from the approved design that would not have been reconciled by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed the finding for a possible cross-cutting aspect in accordance with IMC 0613 Appendix F, "Construction Cross-Cutting Areas and Aspects," and determined the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area because the licensee's contractor, WEC, failed to use decision making-practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable. [H.14].

Identified By: NRC

Identification Date: 06/30/2015

Significance: Green

Item Type: ITAAC Finding

Weld Allowable Stress Calculation Not in Compliance with Current Licensing Basis

Green. The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control." Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), failed through their contractor Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC), to correctly translate design basis into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions to correctly translate the design basis for welded structural connections into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. The licensee entered this finding in their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 10060139, Corrective Action, Prevention and Learnings (CAPAL) 100224197, and corrective action report (CAR) 2015-1597.

The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented a substantive non-conservative error in a design document that defines the technical requirements for structural welds that are important to safety. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the construction significance determination process and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate with reasonable assurance that the design function of the affected components would not be impaired by the deficiency. The finding was determined to be an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of Units 3 and 4 ITAACs 760, 761, 762, and 763. The acceptance criteria of these ITAAC require that reconciliation reports, concluding the "as-built" construction conforms to the approved design, are completed for the areas associated with each ITAAC. This finding is associated with deviations from design requirements that would not have been reconciled by the licensee as required by the ITAAC. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area Human Performance (Conservative Bias) because the licensee's contractor, WEC, failed to use decision making-practices that emphasized prudent choices over those that were simply allowable [H.14].

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Procurement/Fabrication

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Construction/Installation

Identified By: NRC

Identification Date: 06/30/2015

Significance: Green

Item Type: ITAAC Finding

Spent Fuel Pool Wall Repair Without an Approved Procedure

Green. The inspectors identified an ITAAC finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure, through their contractor Chicago Bridge and Iron (CB&I), to perform repair activities of the VEGP Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Wall according to an approved engineering disposition or procedure. The licensee entered this finding in their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 10062982, corrective action report (CAR) 2015-1585, and Nonconformance and Disposition report (N&D) SV3-CA20-GNR-000577. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor since it represented a substantive failure to establish an adequate procedure for the mechanical straightening of duplex stainless steel materials. The finding was determined to represent an ITAAC finding because it was material to the acceptance criteria of VEGP Unit 3 ITAAC 763, in that, if left uncorrected, the licensee could not show that the acceptance criteria of this ITAAC was met. The inspectors determined that the failure to repair the spent fuel pool wall according to an approved procedure represented a deviation from the design that would not have been properly reconciled by the licensee.

The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee developed an adequate repair procedure that would correct the out of tolerance condition, and through supplemental testing, verify that the mechanical properties of the duplex stainless steel material were not adversely affected (i.e., the design function of the applicable structure or system would not have been impaired by the deficiency). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area Human Performance (Resources) because the licensee failed to ensure that procedures were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee had established the requirement that all fabrication processes for duplex stainless steel material are in accordance with appropriate procedures, but failed to develop and obtain engineering approval for mechanical straightening activities (a fabrication process) to ensure that the integrity of the spent fuel pool wall would be maintained [H.1].

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